What Sparks Ethical Decision Making? The Interplay Between Moral Intuition and Moral Reasoning: Lessons from the Scholastic Doctrine by Zollo, Lamberto et al.
What Sparks Ethical Decision Making? The Interplay Between
Moral Intuition and Moral Reasoning: Lessons
from the Scholastic Doctrine
Lamberto Zollo1 • Massimiliano Matteo Pellegrini2 • Cristiano Ciappei1
Received: 20 July 2015 / Accepted: 17 May 2016
! Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract Recent theories on cognitive science have
stressed the significance of moral intuition as a counter to
and complementary part of moral reasoning in decision
making. Thus, the aim of this paper is to create an inte-
grated framework that can account for both intuitive and
reflective cognitive processes, in order to explore the
antecedents of ethical decision making. To do that, we
build on Scholasticism, an important medieval school of
thought from which descends the main pillars of the
modern Catholic social doctrine. Particularly, the focus
will be on the scholastic concept of synderesis, which is an
innate human faculty that constantly inclines decision
makers toward universal moral principles. Managerial
implications are discussed, stressing how a rediscovery of
decision makers’ intuitive moral judgments could be rele-
vant in the reflective thinking practice of managers’ ethical
reasoning, thus saving them from rational insensitivity to
ethical dilemmas.
Keywords Ethical decision making ! Dual processing
theory ! Intuition ! Emotion ! Cognition ! Synderesis
Introduction
Following recent corporate scandals in the global economic
scenario, research on ethical behavior has increasingly
developed within the general area of business. In particular,
ethical decision making has progressively gained relevance
in the management literature (Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe 2008). A comprehensive body of research has been
produced, either with a theoretical or an empirical
approach (for an extensive review of this subject see, for
example, Craft 2013; Ford and Richardson 1994; O’Fallon
and Butterfield 2005). A primary and central element of all
this body of literature mainly remains a rationalist and
cognitive approach, among which Rest’s model of ethical
decision making (1986) is one of the most cited specific
frameworks. Building upon this, a variety of theoretically
positive and descriptive models of ethical decision making
have been proposed, all pointing to a predominance of
rational processes (e.g., Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt
and Vitell 1986; Jones 1991; Trevin˜o 1986). In such
models, intuition and emotions are set apart or completely
disregarded, and for this reason the rationalist approach
seems to encounter limitations and shortfalls, especially in
uncertain, unexpected, and dynamic contexts (Groves et al.
2008; Pellegrini and Ciappei 2015; Trevin˜o et al. 2006). In
such circumstances, decision makers rely heavily on their
‘gut feelings,’ emotions, and intuitive mental processes
(Gaudine and Thorne 2001; Zhong 2011). For this reason,
social psychologists and business scholars have recently
rediscovered the importance of the emotive, instinctive,
and intuitive reactions of decision makers (Dane and Pratt
2007; Haidt 2001), a claim that is traditionally supported
by intuition-based models of human cognition (e.g., Evans
2008; Kahneman 2003; Stanovich and West 2000). Thus, it
seems reasonable to say that these intuitive and emotional
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processes, which can be summarized in the expression
moral intuition, deeply influence the decision maker in
such contexts (Provis 2015). In contrast, conscious and
rational processes, which can be summarized in the
expression moral reasoning, in such situations may instead
occur in a later phase to offer a ‘rationale’ or a ‘sense’ for
behaviors and decisions undertaken (Haidt 2001).
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to propose an
integrated theoretical framework for ethical decision
making that is able to take into a better account intuitive
processes or moral intuition and how such processes can
be blended into the traditional rational approach.
Although a few scholars have tried to shed some light on
this aspect, which is considered a pre-stage of the cog-
nitive process (Dane and Sonenshein 2014; Marquardt
and Hoeger 2009; Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2005), such a
theme remains scarcely investigated. For this purpose, we
specifically use the concept of synderesis, a significant
element of the scholastic theory on human morality and
conscience (Aquinas, 1265–1274; 1947; Bonaventure,
1259; 1956), a Catholic school of thought which has
deeply influenced modern Christian social doctrine tradi-
tion (e.g., see Benedict XVI, On Conscience, 2007; Mele´
2016). The concept refers to an innate human habit that
fosters moral judgment and triggers the virtue of practical
reason, as specified by recent managerial literature (Ce-
lano 2013; Das Neves and Mele´ 2013; Dierksmeier and
Celano 2012).
Within this concept, we want to contribute to the tradi-
tional virtue ethics debate that has frequently addressed the
problem of ethical decision making (Arjoon 2010; Bastons
2008; Mele´ 2010), but mainly with intrinsic assumptions of
rationalist rationales (Kohlberg 1969; Rest 1986). Thus, the
research enlarges the debate by deepening the role of syn-
deresis in the instinctive, direct, and automatic formation of
moral intuition and its outcomes, i.e., intuitive moral judg-
ments, showing also why this approach is better than other
possible explanations of the phenomenon. We propose an
integrated framework of ethical decision making that blends
the two traditionally opposed perspectives, i.e., intuitionism
and a rational perspective, in order to better investigate the
antecedents of the ethical decision-making stages and
unpack the concept of moral intuition.
This work contributes to the literature in three ways.
Firstly, it extends the traditional framework about ethical
decision making by blending features of the rationalist and
intuitionist approaches, as we stated above. Secondly, the
research develops a theoretical model for moral intuition.
Thirdly, it enriches the virtue ethics paradigm, thanks to the
concept of synderesis, which allows for a simultaneous
account of both intuitional and rational aspects of the
ethical decision-making process, as explained later.
This study is composed of six sections including this
introduction. In the second section, we illustrate and apply
the dual processing theory of human cognition to ethical
decision making, conceptualizing possible relationships
between the rationalist and the intuitionist approaches. In
the third section, we unpack the notion of moral intuition
and illustrate its role in the ethical decision-making pro-
cess. Next, we introduce the concept of synderesis, pro-
viding propositions about its influences on the overall
ethical decision-making process. Finally, we discuss the
main findings, managerial implications, and contributions
of this paper, along with its limitations, and offer sugges-
tions for future research.
Ethical Decision Making: Traditional and Modern
Approaches
Ethical decision making refers to ‘‘a process by which
individuals use their moral base to determine whether a
certain issue is right or wrong’’ (Carlson et al. 2009, p. 536;
see also Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008). According to
Jones (1991), the main elements that characterize such a
process are moral issues and moral agents; a moral issue
arises whenever an individual behavior may cause favor-
able or damaging consequences for others; a moral agent is
an individual who acknowledges the presence of a moral
issue and acts according to his/her morality. Business
ethics scholars have increasingly studied the relationship
between moral issues and moral agents in the ethical
decision-making domain (Bastons 2008; Mele´ 2010;
Morales-Sa´nchez and Cabello-Medina 2013). However,
traditionally this problem has been tackled with an
approach that the literature refers to as rationalist, while
more recently, especially thanks to the emergence of psy-
chological studies about human intuition (Dane and
Sonenshein 2014; Haidt 2001; Kahneman and Frederick
2002), a new paradigm has developed, referred to as
intuitionist.
The Rationalist Tradition of Ethical Decision
Making
Traditionally, rational cognitive models (see, e.g., Kohl-
berg 1969; Rest 1986) have been thoroughly used in
research on ethical decision making (Craft 2013; O’Fallon
and Butterfield 2005). Particularly, Rest’s four-component
model represents an often used and mentioned tool to
describe ethical decision making (Rest 1986; Rest and
Narva´ez 1994). In this perspective, the ethical decision-
making process begins with a phase of moral awareness,
which is the recognition of a problem involving a moral
issue. The act of acknowledging the existence of a moral
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issue represents the outset of the ethical decision-making
process (Jones 1991; Lewis 1989). In this initial phase, the
decision maker ‘frames’ possible decisions (Tversky and
Kahneman 1986, p. 257), thus revealing his/her ‘sensitiv-
ity’ toward taking others and their welfare into account
(Rest and Narva´ez 1994, p. 9). This phase is further divi-
ded into another two sub-processes; the first is the ‘oper-
ating’ process of the moral agent’s cognition that thinks
about possible actions; the second, the ‘predicting’ pro-
cess, forms ideas about potential outcomes (Bastons 2008,
p. 394). After a moral issue is acknowledged, the second
phase of the process is moral judgment, when the decision
maker formulates a moral judgment about the ethical
dilemma, deciding what has to be considered as morally
correct (Jones 1991). Specifically, in this phase the deci-
sion maker deliberates, so s/he assigns moral labels, such
as ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ to possible actions (Mele´ 2010;
Morales-Sa´nchez and Cabello-Medina 2013). Such a phase
results in moral judgments that assume ‘‘the greatest
importance in ethics’’ (Crossan et al. 2013, p. 570). Once
the ethical situation has been morally judged, the next
phase is moral intent. In this phase, the decision maker’s
cognition ‘structures’ possible actions according to his/her
moral principles (Bastons 2008, p. 394). The moral agent
decides how to act by prioritizing some moral values
above others and being responsible for moral consequences
(Craft 2013; Mele´ 2005). As a result, moral intent reveals
the decision maker’s willingness to implement an ethical
behavior (Trevin˜o et al. 2006). Finally, the fourth phase is
moral behavior, which refers to implementing the ethical
behavior according to the moral agent’s intention (Craft
2013; Morales-Sa´nchez and Cabello-Medina 2013).
According to Rest (1986, p. 15), moral behavior involves
coping with impediments, difficulties, fatigue, and frus-
tration. Hence, one of the main features of the moral
behavior phase refers to the decision maker’s persistence
in implementing an ethical action (O’Fallon and Butter-
field 2005).
Current positive models relying on Rest’s framework
interpret the ethical decision-making process as completely
conscious and controlled by the individual (Crossan et al.
2013). In this way, the decision maker intentionally delib-
erates on moral dilemmas and makes a rational choice
(Morales-Sa´nchez and Cabello-Medina 2013). What emer-
ges is the predominant role of intentional, deliberate, and
rational processes over ethical decision making (Haidt 2001;
Weaver et al. 2014). For this reason, with different approa-
ches, all these paradigms refer to a ‘global’ process of moral
reasoning, whose function is ‘‘to rationalize and provide
clear standards of rational justification for directives by
which to live the moral life and evaluate the moral practices
of individuals’’ (Buchholz and Rosenthal 2005, p. 308).
Some authors assert that the ultimate goal of moral
reasoning is to re-evaluate the decision and then to pro-
vide moral justification for and legitimatization of the
decision maker’s behavior (Sonenshein 2007; Zhong
2011). Whatever is considered as the main purpose of
moral reasoning, an evident call has been made to
understand factors that may come before the traditional
ethical decision-making stages or pre-existing conditions
that may influence such stages (Craft 2013; O’Fallon and
Butterfield 2005; Weaver et al. 2014). Three theories are
particularly relevant in such a matter: the person–situation
interactional framework (Trevin˜o 1986), the social and
environmental contingency models (Ferrell and Gresham
1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986), and the moral intensity
factor (Jones 1991).
Firstly, Trevin˜o’s model (1986) focuses on two classes
of factor: individual and situational. The former category
refers to individual factors pertinent to the decision
maker’s ‘‘experience and circumstances of birth’’ (Ford and
Richardson 1994, p. 206) such as age, education,
employment, personality and values, and Machiavellianism
(Craft 2013; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). The second
category instead refers to particular ‘‘situational pressures’’
(Ford and Richardson 1994, p. 212) that may also affect the
process. Situational factors include organization and
industry characteristics, working group and managerial
influences, and codes of conduct (O’Fallon and Butterfield
2005; Sonenshein 2007). These elements are external to the
ethical decision-making process since they represent pre-
conditions which the decision makers have to cope with.
Ferrell and Gresham’s model (1985) enlarges the set of
contingencies that may affect the process, especially those
related to the decision maker’s socio-cultural environment
(Jones 1991). Those contingencies include organizational
elements such as norms, beliefs and values of social
groups, labeled ‘significant others,’ and professional
opportunities depending on corporate policy, rewards and
punishments (Ferrell and Gresham 1985, pp. 90–92).
Finally, Jones (1991) theorizes that the way decision
makers respond to a particular moral issue depends on the
characteristics of the moral issue itself—a characteristic
called ‘‘moral intensity’’ (p. 372). Specifically, the per-
ceived moral intensity of an issue raises the level of
attention that the decision maker dedicates to the problem
(O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005).
What emerges from such models is that both personal
and environmental factors impact on decision makers’
ability to recognize a moral issue, sharpening or hampering
the whole ethical decision-making process (Hunt and Vitell
1986; Jones 1991). The whole discussion about the rational
approaches of ethical decision making is synthesized in
Fig. 1.
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Criticisms of the Rationalist Tradition: The Role
of Moral Intuition in Ethical Decision Making
This work follows the theoretical debate about components
that precede the ethical decision-making framework (Craft
2013; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). The aim of this
paper is to respond to this call by adopting an integrated
framework where both the traditional and recent studies of
social psychology (e.g., Haidt 2001, 2007; Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008) serve such a purpose.
Modern psychology literature has started to question the
assumption about rationality being the principal component
of ethical decision making. Haidt’s social intuitionist
model (2001, 2003a, 2007) represents one of the most
prominent criticisms of the primacy of rationalist models,
thanks to the emphasis on the concept of moral intuition.
Such a concept is described as ‘‘the sudden appearance in
consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective
valence (good–bad, like–dislike), without any conscious
awareness of having gone through steps of searching,
weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion’’ (Haidt 2001,
p. 818). Interestingly, the adjective ‘affective’ denotes the
influence of an emotional process within the moral intu-
ition construct. Despite both intuitions and emotions con-
curring in the formation of intuitive moral judgments
(Haidt 2003b), the present research is focused on the pro-
cess of intuiting while the discussion about emotions is
only instrumental when considering such a theoretical
analysis. Also, even if closely related, intuitions and
emotions pertain to different spheres of the sensitive level
in the decision-making process, respectively, the cognitive
and appetitive ones (Kim and Johnson 2013; Wang and
Hackett 2015). In general, intuition may appear ‘‘at the
fringe of consciousness’’ (Haidt and Bjorklund 2008,
p. 188; see also Haidt and Joseph 2004), thus stressing the
non-conscious, unintentional, and non-deliberative nature
of moral intuition.
Particularly, Haidt’s model (2001) can be included in
the broader stream of research that adopts what is called the
‘dual processing’ theory of human cognition (Cushman
et al. 2006; Evans 2008; Kahneman 2003; Stanovich and
West 2000). Indeed, the modern psychological debate on
moral judgment recognizes the traditional, ‘conscious-
reasoning’ perspective (Kohlberg 1969; Rest 1986) and, in
contrast, the intuitionist perspective (Haidt 2001, 2007).
According to the former, ‘‘people generate moral judg-
ments by consciously reasoning over the principles they
articulate in moral justifications,’’ while the latter proposes
that ‘‘moral judgments arise as intuitions generated by
automatic cognitive processes, and that the primary role of
conscious reasoning is not to generate moral judgments,
but to provide a post hoc basis for a moral justification’’
(Cushman et al. 2006, p. 1082). As a result, moral rea-
soning is seen as a ‘servant’ of moral intuition, offering
intentional deliberations and rational justification of
something that is already present in the subconscious
(Weaver et al. 2014, p. 104). The central claim of intuition
theorists is that the moral judgment of decision makers is
intuitive and may be more effective than rational infor-
mation processing (Dane and Pratt 2007; Dane and
Sonenshein 2014; Haidt 2001; Zhong 2011).
These claims replicate the dichotomy proposed by the
theory of System 1 and System 2 (Evans 2008; Kahneman
2003; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Stanovich and West
Fig. 1 A comprehensive
rational framework of ethical
decision making
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2000), which individuates two distinct information pro-
cessing systems. Actually, psychological scholars differ-
entiate between the intuitive, reflexive, and automatic
cognitive processes, named System 1—also referred to as
the ‘experiential system’ (Epstein 1994, p. 710)—and the
controlled, reflective, and analytic processes named System
2 (Evans 2008; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Stanovich
and West 2000). System 1 includes instinctive behaviors
that are innately programmed in human cognition and is
defined as rapid, parallel, and automatic in nature, while
System 2 in contrast is described as slow, controlled, log-
ical, and sequential in nature, thus resulting in the human
powerful general purpose reasoning system (Evans 2008;
Stanovich and West 2000). Stanovich (2008) recently
labeled System 1 with the acronym TASS—‘The Auton-
omous Set of Systems’—stressing that these processes
‘‘respond automatically to triggering stimuli; their execu-
tion is not dependent upon input from, nor is it under the
control of, the analytic processing system (System 2); and
finally TASS can sometimes execute and provide outputs
that are in conflict with the results of a simultaneous
computation being carried out by System 2’’ (p. 57). On the
other hand, System 2 allows conscious information pro-
cessing systems resulting in abstract, hypothetical, and
algorithmic thinking (Evans 2008; Kahneman and Freder-
ick 2002). Actually, these two distinct but simultaneous
cognitive processes may be in conflict in particular cir-
cumstances; this is the case of instinctual behaviors that
‘contrast’ an assumption of complete rationality, such as
‘‘overeating, or smoking’’ (Evans 2008, p. 268). The
opposite case is also true, where reflection and deliberation
may rationally deviate the innate and intuitive ethical
propensity of individuals, thus resulting in the ‘unintended
unethicality’ of decision makers (Tenbrunsel and Smith-
Crowe 2008, p. 553; see also Palazzo et al. 2013). In line
with this, integrated models of decision making theorize
interactive and iterative relationships between the intuitive
and rational processes, interpreted as parallel and com-
plementary (Epstein 1994; Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2005).
Such a perspective has recently been named the ‘‘spiraling
process’’ in the ethical decision-making literature (Woi-
ceshyn 2011, p. 312). Hence, the dual processing theory of
human cognition theorizes the ‘‘two minds in one brain’’
approach (Evans 2008, p. 268), differentiating between the
intuitive, automatic, effortless, and unintentional processes,
called System 1, and the reasoned, deliberative, effortful,
and intentional processes, called System 2 (Kahneman
2003; Stanovich and West 2000).
Particularly referring to the dual processing theory of
social judgment, Evans (2008) recently argued that ‘‘Intu-
itive judgments seem to have the System 1 characteristics,
whereas reflective decision making seems much more like
a System 2 process’’ (p. 268). Applying such claims to the
ethical decision-making process, it seems reasonable to
argue that the rationalist approach would consider moral
reasoning as one of the processes of System 2, being the
cognitive process system that any individual activates to
evaluate carefully a situation, come up with a conscious
and deliberate decision, and structure a course of action
(Marquardt and Hoeger 2009; Provis 2015; Woiceshyn
2011). In contrast, intuitive judgment or moral intuition,
being unconditional and spontaneously triggered, seems to
be associated with the automatic reply of System 1 (see
Fig. 2).
Despite purely intuitionist theories being quite categor-
ical, it has been shown that, especially in uncertain,
dynamic, and fast-changing circumstances, decision mak-
ers’ System 1, which in moral terms is associated to the
moral intuition process, becomes particularly relevant and
effective in forming ethical judgments (Groves et al. 2008;
Zhong 2011). However, this current work does not argue
that such claims are absolutely correct; rather it seems
important to acknowledge the role of intuition, as well as
that of reasoning, in forming moral judgment, and blend
these elements into an integrated framework, which stres-
ses the significant function of both intuition and reasoning
in ethical decision making (Dane and Sonenshein 2014;
Sonenshein 2007; Weaver et al. 2014). The integrated
model of ethical decision making we are going to present
considers moral intuition as a pre-stage of the ‘rational’
ethical decision-making process, and in doing this we are
taking into account both intuitionist and rationalist
approaches in relation to the decision maker’s ethical
behavior.
Moral Intuition in Ethical Decision Making
Recent findings reveal that moral intuition, along with the
emotional sphere of human cognition, plays a significant
role in forming intuitive moral judgments (Cushman et al.
Fig. 2 An intuitionist framework of ethical decision making
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2006; Greene et al. 2001; Haidt 2001, 2003a). The attempt
is to unpack moral intuition and deepen the notion of
intuitive moral judgment as an integrated model (Fig. 3)
that blends the intuitionist perspective with the traditional
rationalist one.
The ‘Intuiting’ Process
Firstly, it is necessary to unpack the internal composition
of moral intuition building on recent literature evidences.
Dane and Pratt (2007) stressed a significant distinction
between the process of intuiting and the outcome of moral
intuition (p. 36), adding that the whole process is affec-
tively charged (p. 40). Building on this, it is possible to
unpack moral intuition into two processes, namely intuiting
(Dane and Pratt 2007) and emotional processing (Greene
et al. 2001), and the resulting outcome called affect-laden
intuitions (Haidt 2007).
Decision makers’ intuiting is a non-conscious cognitive
process (Kihlstrom 1987), characterized by speed and fast
information processing (Evans 2008; Kahneman 2003),
able to seize external stimuli and to associate them with
cognitive structures in a way that is interpretable by the
decision maker’s mind schemata (Epstein 1994).
Hodgkinson et al. (2008) define intuiting as ‘‘an automatic
self-process, initiated on the basis of explicitly or implicitly
perceived cues that operates without effort, intention,
conscious awareness or deliberative analytical judgments’’
Fig. 3 The dual processing
model of ethical decision
making
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(p. 14). The authors agree with Dane and Pratt’s differen-
tiation (2007) between such a non-conscious process and
its main outcome, namely intuition. Hence, intuiting may
be interpreted as the first process of a decision maker’s
moral intuition, activated by the immediate, fast, effortful,
and automatic System 1, through which decision makers
seize apparently separated external stimuli that are
unconsciously re-elaborated in a holistic way (Epstein
1994; Kahneman 2003; Kihlstrom 1987). It is also clear
how the intuiting process works without any associations
with System 2 processes, since it does not involve the
decision maker’s conscious awareness (Dane and Pratt
2007; Hodgkinson et al. 2008).
Intuiting acquires relevance in the decision-making
process mostly in dynamic, unclear, and fast-changing
contexts, which typically involve managers to ‘cut through’
details and information (Hodgkinson et al. 2008, p. 14),
take a decision in ambiguous situations with poorly struc-
tured problems (Sinclair and Ashkanasy 2005), and rapidly
exploit cognitive holistic associations in order to make a
judgment (Dane and Pratt 2007).
The Role of Emotion in Moral Intuition
The framework proposed in this research sees emotional
processing as the second process of moral intuition that
comes after the intuiting one and represents an affective
mediator inclining decision makers toward moral affect-
laden intuitions. Actually, affects and emotions represent a
significant element of analysis in moral judgment and
ethical decision-making research, both in the psychological
field (Evans 2008; Fridja 1993; Greene et al. 2001; Haidt
2001, 2003b) and the managerial one (Agnihotri et al.
2012; Gaudine and Thorne 2001; Kim and Johnson 2013;
Lurie 2004).
Traditionally, the debate concerning the role of emo-
tions in human cognition has seen two different perspec-
tives: firstly, the separation between emotion and reasoning
(Zajonc 1984), labeling the former as ‘emotional uncon-
scious’ (Greene et al. 2001; Kihlstrom et al. 2000). An
opposite view instead sees possible the integration between
emotion and reasoning, traditionally attributed to Lazarus
(1984). The author interprets emotions as a result of rea-
soning and, therefore, as integral parts of it. Such a per-
spective may help in understanding the role of emotions as
secondary and often detrimental to the decision-making
process in general, and in the ethical debate consequen-
tially (for an extensive review see Fridja 1993; Haidt
2003b; Kihlstrom et al. 2000). However, the modern psy-
chological debate tends to mitigate such division, propos-
ing models that follow the dual nature of the cognitive
system. Particularly, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) theorize
a differentiation between the ‘‘hot emotional system,’’
called the ‘go’ system, and the ‘‘cool cognitive system,’’
defined as the ‘know’ one (p. 4). While the former shares
the System 1 features, being reflexive, fast, and simple, the
latter shares the System 2 characteristics, namely reflec-
tion, self-control, and slowness (Epstein 1994; Evans
2008). Hence, it is possible to recognize the existence of a
‘hot’ emotive system, which is ‘‘specialized for quick
emotional processing,’’ and of a ‘cool’ system ‘‘specialized
for complex spatiotemporal and episodic representation
and thought’’ (Haidt 2001, p. 823). Only basic emotions
such as happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, and anxiety are
parts of the ‘hot’ system; more complex emotions such as
desire, disgust, jealousy, and empathy instead affect the
higher-order reasoning, or in other words, the rational
reasoning (Haidt 2003b; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999).
Notwithstanding the influence that emotions have on ethi-
cal decision making, emotions will be interpreted only as
an affective mediator of both the intuitive and rational
moral judgment.
The proposed integrated model of ethical decision
making fits well with such a perspective, proposing that the
intuitive ability of the decision maker to perceive, recon-
struct, and evaluate moral issues related to the ethical
dilemma, largely depends on his/her emotional processing
capacity that represents the affective component of intu-
ition (Dane and Pratt 2007). In particular, the emotional
processing is a significant mediator function played by
affects and emotions channeling decision makers’ intuiting
toward affectively charged intuitions (Greene et al. 2001;
Haidt 2001). This emotional processing encapsulates the
experiential state of the decision maker during the actual
circumstances, therefore playing a significant role in
determining intuitive moral judgments (Greene et al. 2001;
Marquardt and Hoeger 2009; Whitaker and Godwin 2013).
For the purpose of a blended model of ethical decision
making, it is important to acknowledge the existence of
different types of emotions impacting on the ethical deci-
sion-making process, as will be presented clearly in the
framework later, specifying that emotions affecting the
intuitive and instinctual decision-making process, or moral
intuition, belong to the ‘hot’ system. In contrast, emotions
of the ‘cool’ system affect the rational and deliberative
process, or moral reasoning. Thus, the emotional chan-
neling in analysis here refers to the basic emotions related
to the ‘hot’ system.
The Intuitive Moral Judgment
As outcomes of the whole moral intuition process, we have
affect-laden intuitions, in a more psychological fashion, or
intuitive moral judgments, in a more ethical fashion, which
represent an a priori response that emerges in a fast and
automatic way (Haidt 2007; Marquardt and Hoeger 2009)
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and result from an affectively charging process (Dane and
Pratt 2007; Greene et al. 2001). While the two aforemen-
tioned processes of moral intuition are completely non-
conscious, their outcome represented by intuitive moral
judgments is accessible to the decision maker’s conscious
thinking (Dane and Pratt 2007; Hodgkinson et al. 2008).
Such intuitive moral judgments are thus the base for an
‘instinctual’ response to a particular situation, usually
unstructured, unclear, and dynamic. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
intuitive moral judgments represent the outcome of moral
intuition that will be rationalized by moral reasoning.
Hence, if the moral issue becomes more structured and
definite, the analytical and rational processes of System 2
seem more effective in producing an ethical judgment and
a consequent ethical behavior (Hodgkinson et al. 2008).
Thus, moral intuition is unpacked in two processes and
summarized in Table 1.
To summarize, moral intuition is the decision maker’s
ability to perceive a moral issue that, simultaneously and
unconsciously, stimulates a reaction according to what are
perceived as the most appropriate moral principles for the
concrete situation (intuiting). This process also depends on
emotions caused by the actual events and the experiential
state of the individual (emotional processing). The result-
ing outcome is represented by intuitive moral judgments
that a priori appear in the ethical decision-making process
(affect-laden intuitions). In line with the intuitionist
perspective, this research acknowledges that, in particular
uncertain and dynamic contingencies, moral intuition and
its outcomes may directly form a moral judgment, even
without the rational deliberation of moral reasoning
(Greene et al. 2001; Haidt 2001; Hodgkinson et al. 2008;
Sonenshein 2007; Zhong 2011). However, at the same
time, it is also true that deliberative and rational decision-
making processes need to occur to strengthen or correct an
intuition. Indeed, it is important to stress that decision
makers are not ‘‘prisoners of their initial intuitions, unable
to change their minds once they have taken a position’’
(Haidt 2003a, p. 197). Accordingly, the research proposes a
blended and balanced model, taking into account the role
of both moral intuition and moral reasoning on ethical
decision making.
Finally, a recognition of the existence of moral intuition
dispositional factors is necessary, especially at the indi-
vidual level, along with the decision maker’s experience,
which may trigger moral intuition and the resultant intu-
itive moral judgments (Dane and Pratt 2007; Dane and
Sonenshein 2014). The framework points to the inner dis-
positions that lead to moral intuition, similarly to the focus
of a virtue ethics approach. However, a pure virtue ethics
approach is not completely applicable, since a ‘deliberate’
practice, such as the case of virtues, seems not to be
appropriate to describe moral intuition, which instead
occurs effortlessly. For this reason, an aim of the paper is to
Table 1 Unpacking moral intuition’s processes and outcome
Moral
intuition
Phases/outcome References
Intuiting A non-conscious cognitive process, characterized by fast,
automatic, and reflexive information processing activated by
System 1. It allows decision makers to seize external stimuli
that are unconsciously re-elaborated in a holistic way, thus
implying rapid intuitive judgments
It represents the first phase of moral intuition and a cognitive
antecedent of the ethical decision-making process
Dane and Pratt (2007), Epstein (1994), Hodgkinson et al.
(2008), Kahneman (2003), Kihlstrom (1987)
Emotional
processing
The affective component of moral intuition that encapsulates
the experiential state of the decision maker, characterizing the
‘emotional unconscious’ of human cognition. Within the
moral intuition process, it is labeled as the ‘hot’ emotive
system
It represents the second phase of moral intuition by channeling
the decision maker’s intuiting toward affectively charged
intuitions
Evans (2008), Gaudine and Thorne (2001), Greene et al. (2001),
Fridja (1993), Haidt (2001, 2003b), Kihlstrom et al. (2000),
Zajonc (1984)
Affect-
laden
intuitions
The outcome of the two phases of moral intuition, which
automatically and instinctively produce intuitive moral
judgments
In our integrated framework, such intuitions a priori appear in
the ethical decision-making process and are afterward
rationalized by moral reasoning, thus producing post hoc
moral judgments
Dane and Pratt (2007), Haidt (2007), Hodgkinson et al. (2008),
Greene et al. (2001), Marquardt and Hoeger (2009)
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enrich the virtue ethics perspective thanks to a particular
human innate habit traditionally associated with the
scholastic moral philosophy, known as synderesis. This
concept, as we will show in the next sections, perfectly
suits the moral intuition paradigm and an integrated ethical
decision-making model, such as the one we proposed.
Synderesis in Scholastic Ethics and Moral
Philosophy
Scholasticism has represented one of the most important
Christian medieval philosophies in Europe (for an exten-
sive review see Dierksmeier 2013; Mele´ 2016). Recently,
Mele´ (2016) defined the term scholastic as ‘‘a method and a
system based on the rigorous conceptual analysis of dif-
ferent positions and a careful drawing of distinctions for a
better understanding of questions under consideration’’ (p.
294). Since scholasticism significantly contributed to the
evolution of the Catholic school of thought, the present
research drawing on such a discipline is completely in line
with the modern Christian approach. Although two great
scholastic periods can be traced, we draw our analysis from
the First Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages (Dierks-
meier 2013; Mele´ 2016), particularly from the main
Franciscan and Dominican intellectuals who mostly con-
tributed to the development of the notion of synderesis,
which is the object of the analysis of the present paper.
The Christian concept of synderesis has ancient origins
rooted in scholastic theory that defines it as a practical
natural habit (Das Neves and Mele´ 2013) and a cognitive
innate disposition (Greene 1991; Ka¨rkka¨inen 2012). In this
work, a comprehensive perspective of this concept is
included; it follows the long-lasting tradition of the
scholastic school (Greene 1991, 1997; Lottin 1942;
Ojakangas 2013; Potts 1980), integrating and enlarging the
original thoughts of Aquinas (Summa Theologica, hereafter
S. Th., ed. orig. 1265–1274; 1947). This attempt is made in
order to enrich the modern debate on ethical decision
making by integrating the role of moral intuition and moral
reasoning in the human cognitive process. Indeed, the
research follows a broader definition and notion of syn-
deresis, seen as a natural, innate and affective trait, building
on the scholastic works of St. Bonaventure (Itinerarium
mentis in Deum, ed. orig. 1259; 1956) and Jean Gerson (De
Theologia Mystica, ed. orig. 1420; 1958) that seem to be
more in line with the recent psychological research on
moral judgment. This approach is preferred, rather than a
strict adherence to the ‘cognitivist theory’ of Aquinas
(Gorevan 2000, p. 141), in order to still use and enlarge the
Thomistic tradition, which is considered highly valuable
and capable to interpret even the most recent evidences of
the psychological evolution. Such a theoretical building
allows this work to propose an integrated model that is in
line with modern psychological theories of moral behavior,
particularly the socio-intuitionist model (Haidt 2001, 2007),
which stresses the effective role of moral intuition in the
ethical decision-making process.
As shown later, in the specific analysis of the concept of
synderesis, the analysis used a time-spanning lode of
scholastic studies in order to define this concept, including
facets of Aquinas’ original thought. Despite that, a necessary
premise seems to be required. The perspective adopted in this
study assumes synderesis to be an instinctus naturae—a
divine natural instinct present in every human being—ca-
pable of providing moral inclination, thanks to the natural
law implanted by God in men’s souls (for a commentary see
Greene 1997, p. 180; Ojakangas 2013, p. 53). This per-
spective, specifically derived from the scholastic theory of
the thirteenth century, provides elements in line with Aqui-
nas’ traditional definition and concept of synderesis (S. Th.,
Ia, q.79, a.12; Ia–IIae, q.94, a.2); however, this research also
significantly departs from it. More precisely, Aquinas—the
most influential Dominican intellectual of the First
Scholasticism (Mele´ 2016)—describes synderesis as ‘‘the
law of our intellect insofar as it is the habit that contains the
precepts of natural law, that is, the first principles of human
actions’’ (S. Th., Ia–IIae, q.94, a.2). Thus, as in the approach
adopted in this research, the natural essence of synderesis is
extensively present in Aquinas’ thought (Quaestiones Dis-
putatae de Veritate, hereafter De Veritate, ed. orig.
1256–1259; 1972, q.16, a.1, arg.5). The universal principles
of law are attributed to synderesis, which is consequently
interpreted as the natural ability of humans to judge (Celano
2013; Lottin 1942). Specifically, Lottin (1942) recognizes
natural law as constituted by the universal principles of
morality and synderesis as the human innate disposition able
to reveal them (p. 569). In the Thomistic perspective, syn-
deresis is interpreted in a pure, cognitiveway bydefining it as
a natural habit that represents an integral element of the
human reasoning process (S. Th., Ia, q.79, a.12), which
allows the pursuit of moral principles and influences indi-
viduals’ ability in discerning moral decisions from immoral
ones (De Veritate, q.16, a.1, a.2; q. 17, a.1, a.2). Aquinas in
associating the innate habit of synderesis with the principles
of natural law was influenced by Philip the Chancellor’s
Summa de Bono (1985, pp. 1225–1228), one of the first
theological treatises on morality, where synderesis is inter-
preted as a component of the highest part of the human soul
that ‘‘directs human judgments toward goodness and away
from evil’’ (Celano 2013, p. 12; see also Lottin 1942). Par-
ticularly, Philip distinguishes synderesis, interpreted as
‘‘voluntas naturalis,’’ from human ‘‘liberum arbitrium’’
(free choice), in that the former is naturally directed toward
good while the latter may be attracted both by moral and
immoral choices (Summa de Bono, I, 162–167).
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Whereas Aquinas defines synderesis as an intellectual
disposition of human beings, different interpretations of the
concept are especially attributed to the works of St. Bon-
aventure (1956) and Gerson (1958). St. Bonaventure, who is
the Franciscan intellectual leader of the First Scholasticism
(Mele´ 2016), associates the term synderesis with the notion
of instinctus naturae (natural instinct), adding that syn-
deresis operates at the affective and emotional level in order
to incline man toward morality without deliberative efforts
(Greene 1991; Lottin 1942; Ojakangas 2013). Hence, St.
Bonaventure (In Quartum Librum Sententiarum, ed orig.
1259; 1889) defines synderesis as an affective habit of the
natural will, reinterpreting Lombard’s seminal definition
(Liber Primus Sententiarum, ed. orig. 1152; 2007) of the
term, which refers to man’s will being naturally inclined
toward morality (Potts 1980). Building on Bonaventure’s
definition, Greene (1997) states, ‘‘So synderesis has now
become the term for that involuntary orientation and
movement of the natural will in the affective part of man’s
soul’’ (p. 187; see also Ojakangas 2013 and Potts 1980).
Accordingly, Gerson (1958) interprets synderesis as an
instinct that comes directly from God and inclines humans
toward morality, specifically defining synderesis as a human
‘‘ineradicable instinct (instinctus indelebilis)’’ (Ojakangas
2013, p. 54). Gerson differentiates between cognitive and
affective human powers and collocates synderesis at the top
of affective powers, defining it as an instinctus naturalis in
boni (natural instinct for good) (Greene 1997, p. 190);
however, such an interpretation of synderesis is largely
accepted—even in previous studies. For example, in support
of this claim is the position of the scholastic theologian
Thomas Gallus (Commentary on Isaiah, ca. 1218; for a
commentary see Javelet 1961) who clearly separates human
intellectus (intellect) from affectus (affection) and, in doing
so, associates synderesis with the notion of principalis
affectio (main affection) (Javelet 1961, p. 289). Hence, the
interpretation adopted here about the nature of synderesis is
in accordance with this latter perspective; synderesis is
considered to be an ‘instinct’ rather than a deliberative pro-
cess as with the original Aquinas thought.
Building on scholastic theories that stress the affective,
natural and innate features of synderesis, the next sections
highlight how such a concept of the Christian tradition can
be perfectly blended in an ethical decision-making model
by considering both moral intuition and moral reasoning.
Synderesis as Innate Inclination Toward Moral
Intuition
Synderesis has an important role in Christian tradition, as
its origin demonstrates. The first appearance of the term
refers to Saint Jerome who in the year 415 cited this word
in his Commentary on Ezekiel’s vision of four creatures
with different faces, namely a human, a lion, an ox, and an
eagle, supporting the divine throne (Lombard 2007; for a
review see Langston 1993, 2011). The Saint associates
synderesis with the eagle representing the spark of human
reason and revealing ‘‘the candle of the Lord’’ that allows
moral discernment (Greene 1991, p. 196; see also Greene
1997; Ka¨rkka¨inen 2012). Actually, among medieval
scholastic theologians, this interpretation is recurrent and
synderesis is the scintilla rationis (spark of reason) related
to a natural inclination of human beings toward intuitively
discerning the correct act (Greene 1991, 1997; Lottin 1942;
Potts 1980). This is possible thanks to the principles of the
natural law imprinted, for the tradition, in the soul of each
individual (Bonaventure 1956; Lombard 2007). According
to these early scholastic constructs, the concept of syn-
deresis highlights its main feature, i.e., innate nature
(Greene 1991, 1997).
This element is perfectly in line with the characteristics
previously attributed to System 1 and so to moral intuition.
Thus, synderesis seems reasonably the ‘correct’ natural
habit used during the process of moral intuition; in other
words, synderesis is the correct habit that regulates intu-
ition due to its innate nature and it is present in every
individual.
Synderesis as the Catalyst of Intuitive Moral
Judgments
In the late Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, the
relationship between the innate natural habit of synderesis
and human moral behavior received widespread attention
(Greene 1991, 1997; Ka¨rkka¨inen 2012). For Gerson (1958),
synderesis is a guiding ability of human cognition toward
moral principles (Greene 1991). Similarly, the Thomistic
philosopher Peyligk, in Philosophie naturalis compendium
(1499), interprets synderesis as an affective disposition that
follows universal moral principles, thus inclining human
behavior toward good (Ka¨rkka¨inen 2012). This role of
synderesis, which in such a perspective is assimilated to
human natural law, inclines human behavior toward moral
evaluation and moral decision (Greene 1997). Also Martin
Luther (Dictata Super Psalterium ed. orig. 1515; 1964),
with a completely different ontology, sees synderesis as a
human cognitive ability to avoid immoral decisions, thus
aiming at the most morally correct behavior.
The common ground of all these interpretations is that
synderesis inclines decision makers’ cognition toward
moral judgment without what today would be called a
proper process of rational deliberation; it allows ‘‘the
immediate grasp of concrete reality’’ without conscious
reasoning (Liebert 2008, p. 74). Hence, this Christian
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concept seems to be in line with the recent social intu-
itionist model that indeed attributes to moral intuition an a
priori cognitive function influencing post hoc moral rea-
soning. Such an aspect of synderesis is extremely relevant
to the present conceptualization; in particular situations,
i.e., dynamic and uncertain conditions, thanks to synderesis
the intuitive moral judgment made by moral intuition—
even without a deliberate process—can result as being
rightful. This concept can be further discussed; considering
synderesis as capable of conferring rightful connotations to
moral intuitive judgments would imply that even without a
deliberate effort these judgments are ‘embryonically’ or
‘primordially’ inclined toward goodness. Thus, synderesis
renders rightful the intuitive moral judgment even without
a deliberative cognitive effort.
Synderesis as an Antecedent of the Ethical
Decision-Making Process
Commonly, synderesis is seen as a trustworthy part of the
soul, a kind of primal conscience able to predispose to
goodness (for a review of this interpretation see Benedict
XVI, On Conscience, 2007). Similarly, in a more man-
agerial fashion, Das Neves and Mele´ (2013, pp. 773–776)
argue that synderesis refers to the innate natural cognitive
habit that allows decision makers to seek moral behavior,
make moral judgments, and reject evil temptations.
Synderesis, as already shown in medieval interpreta-
tions, is an innate ability to readily discern the natural law
principles. However, the natural law by its nature is the
primordial imprinting given by God to the human soul to
be prone instinctively (innately) to goodness (Das Neves
and Mele´ 2013). Thus, the natural law is a universal truth
that is utterly trustworthy, and its moral principles indi-
cated by synderesis are infallible (De Veritate, q.16, a.2;
q.17, a.2). However, this broad interpretation requires a
more specific discussion about synderesis to avoid confu-
sion and overlap with other concepts still related to ethical
decision making. The first differentiation is with con-
science, ‘‘synderesis grasps the basic moral principles
which are the first premises of practical reasoning, while
conscientia (conscience) is the conclusion, the act of
judging that one ought to perform a particular action’’
(Korsgaard 2013, p. 110). In addition, Dierksmeier and
Celano (2012) also argue that synderesis represents a per-
petual human moral principle constantly inclining toward
rectitude, a concept also found in the thoughts of Aquinas
(Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, ed. orig. 1254–1256;
2000, II, d.24, q.3, a.3). This aspect differentiates syn-
deresis from individual conscience that can be obstructed
by faulty moral reasoning (Korsgaard 2013). On the same
level, Verplaetse (2009) also stresses the difference
between synderesis, considered as the infallible divine
precept present in every individual, and conscience, inter-
preted as the application of that infallible set of principles
that may result in immoral behavior caused by misleading
reasoning. Whether or not these approaches are completely
to be espoused, the common and relevant aspect for this
research is that synderesis is the habit that precedes the
cognitive stage of moral reasoning. Yet, synderesis seems
to suit a ‘balanced’ framework that integrates both the
rationalist and intuitionalist approach. As premised in the
previous paragraph, synderesis confers rightful contents to
intuitive moral judgments; such ‘judgments’ are also used
in the formal or rational processes of moral reasoning.
Hence, it is possible to summarize that synderesis is an
antecedent of the ethical decision-making process, giving
the rightful base from which to develop a complete moral
decision.
Synderesis as an Innate and Acquired Habit: The
Dual Nature of Synderesis
The previous sections showed how (1) synderesis as an
innate habit is the correct basis that can be applied to moral
intuition; (2) synderesis confers rightful connotations to
intuitive moral judgments without a deliberative effort; and
(3) synderesis is considered to be an antecedent of moral
reasoning. However, synderesis does not only ‘offer bases’
for moral reasoning, it concretely contributes to reason-
ing’s perfection.
In order to apply such a scholastic notion to an integrated
framework that attempts to combine the intuitionist and
rationalist perspectives, the research specifically refers to the
Dominican theologian John Poinsot (Tractatus de Signis, ed.
orig. 1632; 1985). Poinsot, in his discussion about the ‘nat-
ural’ and ‘acquired’ aspects of synderesis habitus (habits),
describes them as ‘‘partim acquisiti, partim naturales’’
(partially acquired, partially natural) (Forlivesi 1993,
p. 398). Despite the fact that such a differentiation does not
emerge in the original thoughts of Aquinas, the Saint already
theorized some kind of seminal elaboration on this topic by
separating the ‘affective knowledge,’ called per quandam
connaturalitatem (on account of connaturality), from the
knowledge called per modum cognitionis (on account of
reason) (S. Th., IIa–IIae, q.45, a.2). According to Smith
(1998), ‘‘Aquinas argues regarding the first principles of
prudential practice that they are known to us ‘by nature’, that
they are ‘connatural to us’ (connaturalia homini), and that
they can be known by ‘natural temperament’ (naturali dis-
positione)’’ (p. 38). Building on this differentiation, Poinsot
(1985) interprets synderesis, firstly, as a natural human habit
naturally inclined toward deep-rootedmoral principles of the
natural law that intuitively disposes toward correct andmoral
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judgment, what can be called innate synderesis. Secondly,
synderesis is also an acquired faculty that, according to
environmental and experiential factors, is assimilated by the
individual’s reasoning. This acquired faculty ‘pushes’ the
rational reasoning toward correct behaviors (Forlivesi 1993).
This second dimension, which we call acquired synderesis,
is not fully natural, despite the principles to which it refers
being universally true (natural law). In this regard, acquired
synderesis requires an effortful and continuous engagement
toward finding moral principles, and needs to be practiced at
any occurrence, similarly to the traditional definition of
virtue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, hereafter NE, VI, 5,
1138b24ff; 1998).
Innate synderesis in the model presented, which wants to
include the intuitionist approach in ethical decision making,
plays a major role and it has been thoroughly examined in
the previous discussion. However, we cannot deny the fact
that synderesis, the acquired one this time, may also influ-
ence moral reasoning directly, inclining it toward goodness.
In a concise way, firstly, the natural habit of synderesis or
innate synderesis is a pre-rational cognitive disposition that
helps intuition by taking into account universal moral
principles. Secondly, the acquired habit of synderesis or
acquired synderesis inclines the rational cognitive process
toward good, so that the rational deliberation does not
draw away from universal moral principles.
The Role of Synderesis in the Dual Processing
Model of Ethical Decision Making
After we built the set of considerations about synderesis by
drawing upon scholastic moral philosophy (Bonaventure
1956; Gerson 1958; Poinsot 1985), blending themwith recent
psychological approaches (Haidt 2001, 2007; Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008), we propose an integrated model of ethical
decision making highlighting the role of synderesis (Fig. 4).
We will illustrate how, firstly, synderesis in its ‘innate’ part
may represent the initial input in forming a spontaneous and
instinctive intuitivemoral judgment and, secondly, synderesis
in its ‘acquired’ part is a significant influencing element for the
moral reasoning phase. In the next sections, wewill give a full
account of the links and influences that synderesis has on the
whole ethical decision-making process, both on moral intu-
ition and its elements, i.e., intuiting, emotional processing and
affect-laden intuitions, and on moral reasoning.
The Role of Synderesis in Moral Intuition
The fundamental function of innate synderesis, interpreted
as an innate human habit, is to facilitate and prompt ethical
decision making in order to let the decision maker
immediately discern ethical from unethical behaviors.
Synderesis reflects well the essence of Christian ethics that
prescribes the moral standards decision makers have to
follow in order to discern between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’
(Kim et al. 2009, p. 119). As a result, we may argue that
synderesis supports ethical decision making in a business
context, fostering a moral disposition toward good
behaviors.
As shown in Fig. 4, the innate synderesis triggers moral
intuition. Specifically, the role of synderesis refers to the
ability to balance both intuiting and emotional processing,
i.e., the two processes of moral intuition. Specifically, in-
nate synderesis shapes the decision maker’s rapid and
unconscious intuiting that represents the first process of
moral intuition (Dane and Pratt 2007; Haidt 2001;
Hodgkinson et al. 2008). As we said, the intuiting process
of decision makers is a fast and reflexive process that
automatically appears in consciousness (Dane and Pratt
2007). Since synderesis seems to trigger practical reason
(Das Neves and Mele´ 2013), at an unconscious level it
enriches the decision maker’s intuitive system. The con-
crete situation in which a moral issue takes place impacts
on the experiential system of the decision maker (Dane and
Sonenshein 2014; Marquardt and Hoeger 2009; Whitaker
and Godwin 2013) and, regarding the intuiting process, we
may argue that innate synderesis facilitates a continuous,
increasing reception of external stimuli present in a moral
issue. Although an unconditional process, intuiting
imprints the experiential system of the decision maker who
will feel an easiness/uneasiness in performing such an act.
Thus, innate synderesis due to its intrinsic nature and being
the ‘spark of conscience’ (Celano 2013; Greene 1991;
Langston 1993) can be a reasonable element to strengthen
the experience toward critically ‘assessing’ the situation
and increasing the reception of external stimuli within the
situation. Hence, we propose that:
Proposition 1: Innate synderesis impacts on the
decision maker’s unconscious cognitive process of
intuiting by promptly predisposing the intuitive
reception of external stimuli toward morality.
Once the intuiting process is accomplished, the next
process refers to the emotional processing of the decision
maker’s moral intuition (Greene et al. 2001). The innate
synderesis is crucial in emotionally channeling moral
intuition. Depending on the emotional state of the decision
maker, opposite feelings such as happiness and anger, or
any other emotion belonging to the ‘hot’ system (Metcalfe
and Mischel 1999), may alter the reception of signals and
limit the spectrum of information available in that partic-
ular moment (Haidt 2001, 2003b). As argued by Whitaker
and Godwin (2013), ‘‘fearful individuals favor deliberation
and safety, whereas anger leads to less analysis and more
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risk-taking’’ (p. 63). Thus, decision makers’ feelings
notably affect the evaluative process (Marquardt and
Hoeger 2009). Instead, innate synderesis firmly leads the
decision maker’s intuiting toward universal truth and moral
principles, thereby regulating possible excessive emotional
reactions. Psychological research would support such a
claim, referring to the fact that emotions and intuition are
linked one to another thanks to the experiential system
(Dane and Sonenshein 2014; Epstein 1994). Hence, in such
a cognitive area, emotionally significant experiences
influence the decision maker’s moral intuition, reflecting
prior social events and past learning that morally affected
the individual information processing systems.
So, innate synderesis, in framing the experience of the
intuiting toward the goodness thanks to a balanced emo-
tional channeling process, attenuates dystonic learning
loops. We propose that:
Proposition 2: Innate synderesis attenuates the deci-
sion maker’s altered emotive condition, due to the
most basic emotions associated with the intuitive
cognitive system, by regulating possible variations of
his/her experiential state in order to channel the
emotional processing toward pure moral principles.
The Role of Synderesis in Intuitive Moral
Judgments
The main results of moral intuition are intuitive moral
judgments (Dane and Pratt 2007; Haidt 2001), interpreted
as rapid responses to the ethical dilemma a decision maker
has to tackle. These judgments are affect-laden intuitions
(Haidt 2007) as a result of emotions, feelings, past and
current experience, and environmental factors that mean-
ingfully impact on the decision maker’s cognitive moral
development (Groves et al. 2008; Kohlberg 1969; Mar-
quardt and Hoeger 2009). Innate synderesis firstly allows
the decision maker to channel external stimuli and his/her
affective emotions toward an ethical decision; secondly,
innate synderesis allows decision makers to respond
according to appropriate moral principles for a particular
situation, thus disentangling moral dilemmas and forming
the resulting affect-laden intuitions. We acknowledge the
fact that this process is mostly unconscious (Dane and Pratt
2007; Hodgkinson et al. 2008; Kahneman 2003), so cannot
be handled by the decision maker personally but only
through an experiential learning circle that, only at a later
stage, becomes ‘familiar’ to the cognitive structure (Dane
and Sonenshein 2014; Epstein 1994).
Fig. 4 The role of synderesis in the dual processing model of ethical decision making
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We argue that the main result of intuitive moral judg-
ment is the decision maker’s ‘moral labeling’ of the par-
ticular situation, exactly as traditional frameworks stress
for Rest’s moral judgment (Morales-Sa´nchez and Cabello-
Medina 2013, p. 718). Also, innate synderesis, as the
antecedent of moral reasoning, regulates the right ‘use’ of
intuitive moral judgments. It fosters the balancing of the
whole ethical decision-making process, avoiding an
excessive reliance only on intuitive moral judgments that
‘‘can lead to injudicious ethical decision making without
careful consideration of rational information sources’’
(Groves et al. 2008, p. 307).
Hence, the following proposition can be made:
Proposition 3: Innate synderesis inclines the decision
maker’s intuitive moral judgments toward morality
by attenuating possible distortions caused by an
excessive reliance on intuitional processes.
Synderesis fits perfectly into a dual model where both of
the processes, i.e., moral intuition and reasoning, are
included. In other words, synderesis also fosters decision
makers’ moral reasoning inputs. However, we want to
stress that in uncertain, dynamic, and equivocal contexts
that characterize the modern business scenario (Groves
et al. 2008; Pellegrini and Ciappei 2015), the role of
automatic and rapid moral evaluations represents a signif-
icant element (Dane and Pratt 2007; Weaver et al. 2014).
For this reason, it is important to refer to the connotation of
morality that already intuitive moral judgments have, since
this may be the only base used in such circumstances.
The Role of Synderesis in Moral Reasoning
Building on the social intuitionist approach, in our inte-
grated model the cognitive functioning of moral reasoning
is positioned after moral intuition’s main outcome, namely
intuitive moral judgment (Haidt 2001, 2007), as shown in
Fig. 3. Hence, moral reasoning is interpreted as a post hoc
process that works with a conscious, deliberative, and
intentional effort (Provis 2015; Weaver et al. 2014; Zhong
2011). However, it is important to stress that our model
does not want to convey the idea that moral reasoning is
only an instrument to ‘rationalize’ intuition, or that it has a
subsidiary role. We are instead supporting the fact that, as
antecedents to moral reasoning, there exists some kind of
natural intuition of the ethical dilemmas, but at the same
time we fully acknowledge the substantial role of moral
reasoning in better elaborating and processing an intuitive
moral judgment, or even rectifying it.
The aim of moral reasoning is to follow predetermined
moral principles so as to address the moral issue of the
actual situation faced by the decision maker (Buchholz and
Rosenthal 2005). As a result, the main function of moral
reasoning is firstly to evaluate the dilemma analytically and
rationally, and later provide moral justification for the
chosen behavior. At this stage, the decision maker’s ac-
quired synderesis, interpreted as a human cognitive faculty
resulting from past and current experiences and environ-
mental influences, allows the avoidance of excessively
rational deliberations that could lead to insensitive analysis
and erroneous calculations at the expense of the ethical
decision-making process (Groves et al. 2008). Indeed, ac-
quired synderesis impacts on the argumentative rational
justification of the decision maker’s moral reasoning,
weakening the insensitive deviations (Buchholz and
Rosenthal 2005). The function of acquired synderesis is to
incline moral reasoning and ethical behaviors toward
goodness, if distortions of some post hoc reflections have
occurred for any reason, pointing back to the process of the
natural principles that synderesis is innately predisposed to
find. In this way, re-evaluations and examinations of moral
reasoning are morally balanced by the decision maker’s
acquired synderesis. As a result, we argue that:
Proposition 4: Acquired synderesis controls possible
distortive rationalization of the ethical decision
making thanks to elevating the individual justification
from an argumentative level to a genuinely moral
one, assuring the acknowledgment of universal moral
principles.
Finally, in such a deliberative phase, it is important to
recognize another role of acquired synderesis which con-
sists of controlling the emotions influencing the rational
sphere of human cognition, i.e., what we previously refer to
as belonging to the ‘cool’ system (Evans 2008; Haidt 2001;
Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). Particularly, such a system is
affected by emotions that literature has defined as ‘moral,’
which play a significant role in forming moral judgment
and ethical behavior (Haidt 2003b). Haidt (2003b) labels as
‘moral’ those ‘‘emotions that are linked to the interests or
welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons
other than the judge or agent’’ (p. 853).
The ‘hot–cool’ theory of emotion (Metcalfe and Mischel
1999) is in line with the original conceptualization of
Thomas Aquinas on the topic (S. Th., Ia–IIae, q. 22, a. 1; see
also King 1999). Particularly, Aquinas recognizes the
existence of sensitive and intellective parts of the soul, both
of which have cognitive and appetitive principles (S. Th.,
Ia–IIae, q. 26, a. 1), and thus also two different types of
human will that oversee the appetites. The voluntas ut
natura (natural will) denotes a spontaneous will of the
decision maker toward bonum (good), while the voluntas ut
ratio (rational will) refers to a deliberative decision-making
process toward verum (truth) (S. Th., IIIa, q.18, a.4).
Actually, it is possible to say that the natural will
L. Zollo et al.
123
corresponds to the process of handling ‘sensitive emo-
tions,’ denoting a spontaneous and natural inclination of
human will toward morality, well exemplified by the love
of God that may produce a natural inclination toward moral
knowledge (S. Th., Ia, q.1, a.6). In contrast, the rational will
deal with ‘rational emotions’ influencing the cognitive
inclination of human will toward the truth (Gorevan 2000;
King 1999). The present interpretation therefore sees sen-
sitive emotions as basic emotions associated with the ‘hot’
system that takes place in System 1, while rational emo-
tions as higher-order reasoning emotions are associated
with the ‘cool’ system that takes place in System 2 (Evans
2008; Metcalfe and Mischel 1999). We also know that
emotions may have a negative effect on moral reasoning, in
line with Aquinas’ interpretation of passions as ‘obstacles’
that ‘pervert’ human reason (S. Th., Ia–IIae, q. 94, a. 4). The
significant role of acquired synderesis refers to preventing
the possible ‘clouding’ of a decision maker’s ethical
judgment being the scintilla rationis—‘spark’ of con-
science (Lombard 2007)—that gives the rightful base for a
deliberative cognitive effort directed toward moral dis-
cernment (Bonaventure 1956; Gerson 1958).
Also in the literature about ethical decision making,
increasing attention has been dedicated to the impact of
emotions on moral reasoning (Agnihotri et al. 2012; Gau-
dine and Thorne 2001; Lurie 2004). Gaudine and Thorne
(2001), for example, theorize a ‘cognitive–affective’ model
recognizing positive impacts on all the four stages, i.e.,
moral awareness, moral judgment, moral intent, and moral
behavior. Other researches similarly reveal how instead
some emotions seem to be more impactful on some moral
stages than on others (Agnihotri et al. 2012; Lurie 2004).
According to Mele´ (2005), positive emotions such as
compassion, solidarity, and sympathy, but also negative
emotions such as greed and self-sufficiency, significantly
impact on the decision maker’s awareness of a moral issue.
Such emotions working at the rational level are labeled
‘moral sentiments’ (Mele´ 2005, p. 104), which differ from
the sensitive basic emotions working in the intuitive ‘hot’
system described above.
This allows us to extend the original Thomistic thought
toward an integrated ethical decision-making framework,
which also considers both kinds of emotion and their roles
in respect to moral intuition and moral reasoning. To
summarize:
Proposition 5: Acquired synderesis prevents emo-
tions, i.e. those that are more sophisticated and
associated with the deliberative cognitive system,
from clouding the rational evaluation of moral
dilemmas by redirecting the rational process to the
ultimate state of truth.
The Employability of the Concept of Synderesis
in a Dual Processing Model
This distinctive nature of synderesis makes it a unique
approach for analyzing the ethical decision-making process
through a dual perspective, i.e., integrating intuitionist and
rationalist perspectives. We offer a brief explanation of
such a claim, showing the drawbacks of other traditional,
ethical paradigms used in the ethical decision-making lit-
erature, i.e., utilitarianism, universalism, and (purely) vir-
tue ethics (Koehn 1995). According to the utilitarian
rationale, decision makers evaluate and choose the alter-
natives depending on the expected effects, thus enhancing
their satisfaction/utility (Kim et al. 2009). Despite the
different sophistications of the utilitarian approach, a
common element of all these theories is that the agent is
rational and able to evaluate the situation and its outcome.
Definitely, such requisites are not met by talking about
intuition, especially the ability to forecast and choose the
preferable outcomes. Conversely, universalism imposes
that every act is performed according to general and tran-
scendental moral principles (Kant, Foundations of the
metaphysics of morals, ed. orig. 1785; 1959). So, from this
perspective, the traditional way to exert a decision-making
process is through applying universal concepts to the par-
ticularities of reality, i.e., the determinant judgment (Kant,
Critique of Judgment, ed. orig. 1790; 1914; 5:
pp. 386–389). However, another kind of judgment is also
present, i.e., reflective judgment, where peculiarities of
reality are connected with universal concepts given by pure
reason. This form of judgment may suit the intuition pro-
cess more; however, as Kant (1914) himself declares, a
reflective judgment is carried out through confrontation
and dialectics and again this connotation does not com-
pletely suit an instinctive process.
Finally, virtue ethics refer to specific human qualities, or
virtues that are dispositions acquired, exercised, and
instructed by moral actions (Crossan et al. 2013; Mele´
2005). Our approach actually draws really close to the
virtue ethics paradigm; however, a strict application of that
paradigm would imply asserting that intuition needs to be
exerted in an effortful way. While we may agree that even
this unconscious process can be sharpened to some extent,
nevertheless it will never be completely under control—as
a proper virtue or moral habit would require. However, our
elaboration of synderesis better suits an integrated model.
Synderesis is both a typically innate and natural human
sense, such as moral intuition (Haidt 2001), and partially
acquired and partially natural (Forlivesi 1993; Poinsot
1985), which satisfies the traditional criteria of a ‘proper’
virtue ethics approach, and its virtuous action influences
the moral reasoning process more.
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Another consideration to be made is that synderesis,
despite having two constituent parts, is not a virtue per se.
Actually, in line with the Thomistic tradition, we acknowl-
edge the fact that in order to be virtuous, the decision-making
process needs moral reasoning. In fact, innate synderesis
regulates the intuitive process and in this way offers an
embryonic intuitive moral judgment inclined toward good-
ness. We are claiming that this basic moral, natural and
innate intuition of morality is ‘intrinsically’ connatural in all
human beings (Dierksmeier and Celano 2012), and also in
accordance with the scholastic thoughts of Bonaventure
(1956) and Gerson (1958). However, in order to act com-
pletely virtuously, this natural inclination is not enough; it is
necessary to have the support of all the other cardinal virtues
(S. Th., Ia–IIae, q.61, a.1). For example, without practical
reason such good initial intuition can be translated into
careless behaviors, or without fortitude the planned and
intended behaviors can be weakened by the harshness of
contingencies. Thus, for all these reasons, synderesis is able
to give moral content to intuition but this is only what we can
call a ‘moral premise’ that does not necessarily lead to vir-
tuous behaviors. However, it is also true that, without such a
universal innate ability oriented toward goodness, the pos-
sibility of being virtuouswould bemuchmore impaired. Yet,
neglecting the naturally and innate inclination toward the
morality of human beings would imply a dangerous
assumption about humannature seen as innately sterile, if not
worse, i.e., wicked, opening up for a dangerously moral
relativism or situationalism (Lewis 1989).
Probably, a much better assumption would be to consider
synderesis as the habit that to some extent contributes towhat
the Ancient Greeks would refer to as enkrateia, whichmeans
‘continence or self-mastery’ (NE, VII, 8, 1151a27–28; see
also Arjoon 2008). Such a state is related to a situation in
which the decision maker, despite appetites and emotions, is
able to act according reason, thus reaching a moral behavior
even without the intervention of a virtuous process (Arjoon
2008, p. 228). We admit that enkratic people in this per-
spective are seen as rationalist agents but, as we stressed
many times within this work, our principal aim is to give
theoretical foundations to the last evolutions of psychology
by highlighting the significant role of moral intuition for an
integrated ethical decision-making process. Thus, synderesis
leads to self-mastery (enkrateia) as far as it regulates emo-
tions and instincts, particularly the most irrational and
‘eruptive’ of the ‘hot’ system during the intuitive phase
(innate synderesis). At the same time, during the ‘rational’
process, it preserves the decision maker’s cognitive process
from distortions that would deviate reasoning from moral
judgment and behavior (acquired synderesis).
Specifically in relation to the virtue of practical rea-
soning, the ‘acquired’ feature of synderesis (Poinsot
1985)—which constantly reminds of innate moral contents
during moral reasoning—seems able to facilitate the
application of such a virtue to a potential or virtual status.
This is a premise for an executive habitus that, finally,
implies a virtuous behavior. Decision makers uncon-
sciously elaborate intuitive moral judgment, as we said
through innate synderesis, whenever there is a moral issue
to be discerned. However, thanks to the habit of acquired
synderesis, also a ‘routinization’ of such judgments occurs.
Thus, acquired synderesis facilitates a particular form of
moral common sense, namely synesis, which, according to
Aquinas, is one of the potential parts of practical reason—
along with eubolia and gnome—rightly able to judge in
ordinary cases (S. Th., IIae–IIae, q.51, a.3, a.4; Pellegrini
and Ciappei 2015). As a result, the constant natural incli-
nation toward good of innate synderesis may become a
potential virtuous practice thanks to its ‘acquired’ element,
which functions as an elicitor of synesis and its judgment in
ordinary cases where the discernment follows known paths.
Although this discussion about synderesis and practical
reason is only embryonic and beyond the scope of the
present paper, it could be an interesting avenue for future
developments.
Implications for Managers
The decisionmaker’smoral reasoning has to be continuously
overhauled for what Benedict XVI referred to as ‘‘ethical
blindness caused by the dazzling effect of power and special
interests’’ (Deus Caritas Est, 28, a, 2005). Palazzo et al.
(2013) define ethical blindness as ‘‘the temporary inability of
a decision maker to see the ethical dimension of a decision at
stake’’ (p. 325), due to the rational incapacity of accessing
moral principles that are naturally innate. This is particularly
relevant in business contexts, where economic, financial, and
political interests frequently stimulate managers’ rational
insensitivity to ethical dilemmas (Groves et al. 2008; Ten-
brunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008). As previously stated, the
main function of moral reasoning refers to rationalize, re-
examine, and justify decision makers’ moral judgment
(Buchholz and Rosenthal 2005). Actually, managers’
rational decision making may sometimes be excessively
characterized by a consequential and preference-based atti-
tude that pursues the maximization of individual prefer-
ences. Moreover, an excessive reliance on utilitarian
reasoning about individual benefits may incline decision
makers toward consequentialism aimed at outcome-based
judgment (Kim et al. 2009). As a result, consequentialist
decisionmakingmay inducemanagers toMachiavellianism,
defined as ‘‘amoral in the sense that the end, which is usually
winning, is sufficient justification for the means’’ (Miesing
and Preble 1985, p. 467). Hence, managers showing high
Machiavellianism may pursue objectives by neglecting
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intuitive moral judgments on behalf of unethical tactics and
strategies. Consequently, the deliberative sub-process of
rational justification present in moral reasoning may deviate
from managers’ intuitive moral judgments that previously
resulted from moral intuition.
The theoretical insights proposed in this paper seem to be
relevant in the modern debate related to the reflective prac-
tice of ethical reasoning, particularly analyzed inmanagerial
education and management development literature (Small
and Cullen 1995). The traditional framework of ‘reflective
thinking’ generally accepted in pertinent literature (Schon
1983), mainly focuses on the rational aspects of human
cognitive processes. The accent has been prevailingly placed
onmanagers’ awareness and perception of a particular issue,
which, in moral terms, represents the first component of
Rest’s rationalist framework (1986) of ethical decision
making (moral awareness). Traditionally, management
development programs provide reflective actions such as
‘critical reflection,’ ‘reframing,’ and ‘unlearning/relearning’
activities, through which the educational development of
decisionmakers is improved (Small andCullen 1995). In this
context, moral issues should also represent elements upon
which the decision maker has to reflect. Precisely, one of the
main ‘action points’ that our model would like to stimulate
refers to the ‘rediscovery’ of intuition and intuitive moral
judgments when reflecting upon moral issues. In this way,
the decision maker will reflect and deliberate not only on the
moral judgment resulting from the reasoning process, but
also on the spontaneous intuitive moral judgment resulting
from the moral intuition phase. The scholastic concept of
synderesis actually serves a crucial function in this process.
This role of synderesis becomes significant when managers,
for example, focus on economic evaluations, such as in cost/
benefit analysis. In such circumstances, moral reasoning
risks being misled by immoral judgments that result in
unethical decision making. Hence, one of the main critical-
ities of ethical decision making refers to managers’ misled
moral reasoning that may supersede synderesis, producing in
this way both unethical judgments and behaviors.
As a result of the above considerations, a ‘rediscovery’
of the idea of moral intuition allows managers to reflect on
and re-think what their unconscious instinctual response
was, and hopefully to ‘re-calibrate’ their judgments on
ethical dilemmas. In this way, the effectiveness of the
whole ethical decision-making process should be
increased.
Conclusion
The traditional rationalist framework of ethical decision
making has been challenged by recent psychological and
managerial literature, which stresses the importance of
unconscious elements of decision makers’ cognition, such
as intuition and emotions. Building on the recent social
intuitionist perspective, our discussion led us to interpret
moral intuition as an antecedent of the ethical decision-
making process, to be blended with the traditional moral
reasoning or the deliberative and intentional process. Fur-
thermore, we use the scholastic framework to enlarge the
virtue ethics approaches. Particularly, the scholastic con-
cept of synderesis, thanks to its dual nature, allowed us to
integrate the innate ability of moral intuition with moral
reasoning in the ethical decision-making framework.
We recognize that our paper suffers from some limita-
tions, mostly because our considerations and propositions
are purely theoretical and not supported by empirical evi-
dence. For example, an experimental setting could be
useful to empirically test the assumptions that moral intu-
ition precedes the stages of the ethical decision-making
framework. Concerning future researches, it would be
interesting to apply the whole socio-intuitionist framework
(Haidt 2001) in a managerial context, thus analyzing how
social persuasion and social influence link the impact on
the ethical decision-making process. Furthermore, a rele-
vant issue that has not received appropriate consideration is
what happens when the two cognitive systems of human
decision making—Systems 1 and 2—contrast and how the
resulting conflicts may be handled by decision makers.
Particularly, relevant attention should be given to the role
emotions have whenever they are in contrast to individual
moral reasoning. Another interesting future direction for
this work is using our conceptualization of ethical decision
making in the context of entrepreneurship personality traits
(Rauch and Frese 2007). Particularly, some features of
successful entrepreneurs are innate while others are
achieved thanks to training and experience. Thus, our
model may be employed in this field of research in order to
better understand how moral intuition is related to entre-
preneurial performance.
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